Acho que estou ficando cada vez mais utilitarista, mesmo sem uma noção clara do que considero bom (ou útil), aliás, acho que vou postar algo sobre a noção de bem qualquer dia.

Acho que racionalidade está mais associada a conduta orientada por conhecimentos, princípios e regras em oposição a condutas orientadas por qualquer outro tipo de coisa. Neste sentido qualquer sistema mecânico de inferência seria racional, mas não necessariamente inteligente.

Acho que é por isto que a racionalidade é frequentemente identificada com conveniência econômica/moral, por estes serem frequentemente associados a principios e conhecimento e oposta à emoção, que seria uma modalidade alternativa de conduta.

Duas respostas me vieram rapidamente:
1. Talvez essa idéia de fato guie mtas práticas políticas, mas por ser tão óbvia seus atores ñ a formulam, como se fosse algo q de tão presente ñ se vê.
2. Acho q a prática política está mto misturada com uma “moralzinha política”. Tipo uma cartilha do politicamente correto q acaba ficando no lugar da verdadeira reflexão sobre o q é ou não importante. Enfim, roupa nova pros velhos bons costumes.
3. Pensar nas consequências de nossas ações a nivel social é bem difícil. Aliás, fazer qq coisa a nível social é bem difícil. Precisa ter mta criatividade para fazer algo q surta efeitos sensíveis antes de vc morrer. Talvez por ser mto difícil pensar na coisa q faria mais diferença, nós nos prendamos aos caminhos mais tradicionais. Como q por uma preguiça mental (ou absoluta incapacidade) de se defrontar com um problema complexo como este.

Não consegui pensar mta coisa, mas vai o comentário com a pergunta. Afinal, uma boa diferença de se fazer seria conseguir q as pessoas se dediquem mais a fazer a diferença do q a seguir a cartilha do “politicamente correto”.

Sério, só leia se você leu o artigo. Pule o parágrafo caso contrário.
Adotando cardinalidades transfinitas (E a hipótese do contínuo) num universo infinito com infinity shades eu adotaria class action porque acomoda melhor minhas intuições pessoais de fazer o bem ao que me circunscreve. Na prática acho razoável adotar uma visão de ética sobre o que eu tenho influência causal com uma taxa de desconto por distância. E acho também razoável assumir que não existem regiões finitas do espaço-tempo cujo valor ético é infinito. Um approach causal, com taxa de desconto por distância, hiper-reais e infinity shades resolve todos os meus problemas pessoais de ética. Class action é minha proposta para que as outras pessoas, com exigências mais sofisticadas que eu, resolvam os delas.

No entanto, sua lógica parece inconsistente com sua escolha do “class action” (se bem me lembro o nome) para o problema de ações éticas num universo infinito (problema sem noção). Também, no caso de uma eleição pode não fazer diferença um voto, pois ele não tem efeito nenhum, mas em outros casos uma ação pode ter um efeito que vale a pena, mesmo que pequeno.

Pensando no “class action”, se houvesse um grupo de 20 mil Diegos querendo um resultado na eleição, e esse resultado fosse perdido por 16 mil votos, seria mais lógico que os Diegos tomassem outra atitude e esperassem que os seus semelhantes pensassem o mesmo.

Neuropsychoanalysis Journal

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Neuropsychoanalysis – Wikipedia

I didn’t mean that we don’t have ANY kind of access of objective reality. Like I said, it’s not because one can conceive that there is many realities that he cannot conceive that they converge. I meant that our access to objectivity is not one we can have because we have the guarantee of a unique, equal reality experienced by all of us; I meant that, whatever access to objectivity we have is CONDITIONED by the fact that it’s attained THROUGH our subjective reality – which means that there are no a priori guarantee that whatever it is that appears to us as objective is, indeed, as such. In a very, very poor analogy, just as consistency of an arithmetical system cannot be proven within the scope of that very system (as determined by Gödel’s Theorem – one, I confess, I barely know or understand, but, considering how I’m relying on a very restrict and brief analogy, I hope this won’t do any harm), objectivity of a certain knowledge cannot be shown within the subjectivity from which it was produced. To put it clearly: it may be that you have found a “hard fact” of nature, but you have no means of making it certain you did – meaning, by “certain”, any finitary way through which it is shown it’s impossible to conceive such knowledge any other way than objectively.

So, I’m certainly not saying that we have access to ’soft’ facts, but not to ‘hard’ facts. I don’t mean that “a hard fact about nature is impossible to assert, meanwhile a (soft?) fact about a hard fact is the only thing we can talk about”. No matter what we’re talking about or how we’re talking about it, there’s nothing we can undoubtely assert – and that’s valid not only to science, but to philosophy as well. I’m very far from considering philosophy as some sort of all-seeing-god. And I’m very far from assuming that we can only talk of things in philosophical terms. That we cannot guarantee the objectivity of natural science knowledge, doesn’t means that it’s an expendable discourse, even less that philosophy is able to make up for it – we cannot guarantee it’s objectivity either. But it’s not because we cannot guarantee that either of them are objective that they are completely devoid of such, or should be discarded.

I do not concede that, in ANY aspect, one can claim the absolute certainty of science or philosophy; yet, I do not believe that the lack of this certainty forbids the progress of either, nor that their progress is made through the existence of any certainty of such a kind, nor NEEDS to rely on any such hopes.

Which brings me to my point. I don’t believe philosophy and science are fundamentally distinguished by such certainty of their knowledges, but rather, by their approach. It’s not a question of wether one’s approach is closer to the truth than the other’s, but rather, about WHAT KIND OF KNOWLEDGE they produce.

What I believe, in that case, is that one thing that is to blame both science and philosophy is their obstination in sticking to their approaches and neglecting the other one’s one. Even though different, science CAN contribute to the kind of knowledge philosophy search, aswell as philosophy can contribute to further the advance of science, through questioning assumptions that may have contributed to it’s advance so far, but are now impeding it from continuing to move forward. That may send shivers down your spine, but, yes, I do believe that there’s some way of approaching the ideas of philosophers such as Derrida, Hegel, Kant, Deleuze, Adorno, and so on, that can contribute to the progress of science. Aswell as I believe that there are many scientific theories which, properly considered, can provide many philosophical insights (and I’m certainly not excluding from those the very memetics to which you referred).

Your response seemed to assume that I had some sort of hierarchical view, in which philosophy – in the terms you put, as continental philosophy – was the Queen of knowledge, which by far surpassed in it’s developments any “naive” knowledge that science could provide us with. When I talked about naivety, I didn’t mean to imply that. I hope I have made it sufficiently clear that that’s not how I think, and that that wasn’t the background of what I wrote. The idea that Philosophy has to be the Queen of all knowledge is rather absurd to me, because the IDEAL I have in mind is one in which Science and Philosophy (not only analitical, but also continental) are PARTNERS. It’s true that, usually, that philosophy doesn’t look past it’s own nose. But it’s also true that it’s not common to give any sort of well-disposed attention to it. It’s also true that it usually doesn’t give much attention to it’s own “pratical” consequences, in a DETERMINED sense of this word. But it also seems true to me that it’s important to consider wether or not all that matters is that which can be understood under the particular conception of “practicality” that natural science seems to hold. If one is not careful enough to consider wether what they think that is good to do and provide to the others is unrestrictedly so, wether or not it may be bad in another senses, wether or not it may become bad in the future, wether or not it’s good in a short-term, in a long-term, or in both perspectives, there might be severe consequences. If one TRULY cares about the others well-being, then that’s a question that cannot be overly emphatized. There is no lack of examples that show how much bad we can make to people by doing to/with/for them that which we consider good, acting as if there was no reason to question wether or not it is as so. If one truly cares about the others well-being, he’ll know better than be arrogant of his conceptions and beliefs, and will be careful to examine wether or not they really seem the best way to contribute to others’ happiness.